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Introduction		From	early	2009	onward,	smart	power	has	been	the	 leading	 foreign	policy	concept	of	the	Obama	administration.	During	her	Senate	confirmation	hearing	on	13	January	2009,	Secretary	of	State-elect	Hillary	Clinton	stated	 that	 “I	believe	 that	American	 leadership	has	been	wanting,	but	is	still	wanted.	We	must	use	what	has	been	called	“smart	power,”	the	 full	 range	of	 tools	 at	 our	disposal	 –	diplomatic,	 economic,	military,	 political,	 legal,	and	 cultural	 –	 picking	 the	 right	 tool,	 or	 combination	 of	 tools,	 for	 each	 situation.	With	smart	 power,	 diplomacy	will	 be	 the	 vanguard	 of	 foreign	 policy”	 (Clinton	 2009).	 	 Her	speech	before	the	Senate	was	the	starting	point	for	the	embrace	of	smart	power	as	the	basis	on	which	to	formulate	foreign	policy	within	the	American	government.	In	 a	 world	 that	 is	 becoming	 ever	 more	 interdependent	 due	 to	 increased	globalization,	the	nature	of	power	is	changing.	This	changing	power	environment	in	the	current	world	following	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	demands	a	new	way	of	foreign	policy	formulation	 fit	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	 challenges	 that	 are	 posed	 to	 the	 international	system.	In	an	age	in	which	the	challenges	faced	are	increasingly	transnational	in	nature,	such	as	terrorism,	climate	change,	cyber	crime,	a	unipolar	approach	to	foreign	policy	is	no	 longer	 a	 viable	 option.	 Transnational	 challenges	 demand	 increasingly	multilateral	solutions.	 Due	 to	 its	 inherent	 flexibility,	 smart	 power	 provides	 a	 useful	 framework	through	which	policy	can	be	formed	in	the	twenty-first	century.			 Yet	 despite	 the	 necessity	 for	 cooperation,	 large	 political	 conflicts	 are	 still	 the	order	 of	 the	 day.	 A	 visible	 increase	 in	 geopolitical	 tensions	 complicates	 prospects	 for	international	 cooperation	 (Mead	 2014,	 73).	 It	 seems	 that	 these	 two	 tendencies	 -	 the	increase	of	 tensions	 in	geopolitics	at	 the	same	time	as	 increased	 interdependence	and	globalization	 -	 are	 paradoxical.	 While	 the	 challenges	 posed	 to	 the	 world	 demand	 a	coherent	collective	response,	geopolitical	tensions	between	the	United	States	and	other	countries	 reduce	 the	 opportunity	 for	 collaboration,	 especially	 in	 the	 field	 of	international	security.				 Looking	 at	 international	 conflicts	 through	 a	 smart	 power	 framework,	 and	formulating	 foreign	 policy	 according	 to	 said	 framework	 is	 useful	 in	 tackling	 these	conflicts.	 Smart	 power	 forces	 policymakers	 to	 "deploy	 power	 creatively,	 in	 ways	appropriate	to	our	times,	and	synthesizing	the	strengths	of	the	different	instruments	of	state	 power”	 (Wilson	2008,	 113).	 It	 allows	 for	 strategies	 that	 can	 adapt	 to	 the	quick-
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changing	 international	 environment.	 But	 while	 the	 concept	 has	 been	 researched	extensively,	questions	on	how	to	convert	smart	power	theory	into	practice	remain.	It	is	therefore	useful	to	examine	the	way	in	which	smart	power	is	 implemented	in	practice	during	 conflict	 situations.	 This	 question	will	 be	 explored	 through	 the	use	 of	 two	 case	studies,	examining	American	policy	in	the	2014	Ukraine	crisis	and	the	continuing	South	China	 Sea	 conflict.	 Over	 the	 past	 two	 years,	 tensions	 between	 the	 United	 States	 and	Russia	 and	 China	 have	 flared	 due	 to	 Russia’s	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	 and	 China’s	increasing	aggressively	dominant	stance	in	the	South	China	Sea	conflict.	The	arguments	in	 Ukraine	 crisis	 as	 well	 as	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 conflict	 concern	 questions	 of	international	 law,	 and	 apart	 from	 the	United	 States	 involve	 other	 countries	 too.	 Both	Russia	and	China	are	important	players	on	the	world	stage	and	are	permanent	members	of	the	UN	Security	Council.	Yet	the	context	of	their	power	differs.	While	Russia’s	power	has	been	declining	after	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union,	China’s	power	is	on	the	rise.			
Power	in	the	twenty-first	century	In	 order	 to	 fully	 understand	 smart	 power	 as	 a	 concept	 and	 a	 possible	 framework	 for	policy-making,	 it	 is	necessary	to	look	at	the	changing	nature	of	power	first.	Power	is	a	contested	concept	and	there	is	no	consensus	on	its	exact	definition.	Robert	Dahl	defined	his	intuitive	notion	of	power	as	“A	has	power	over	B	to	the	extent	that	he	can	get	B	to	do	something	that	B	would	not	otherwise	do”	(Dahl	1957,	202-3).	The	problem	with	Dahl’s	definition	is	that	it	is	too	narrow	and	too	broad	at	the	same	time.	It	has	a	focus	on	power	
over	 others,	 but	 ignores	 the	 possibility	 for	 influencing	 initial	 preferences	 through	framing	 and	 agenda	 setting	 (Nye	2011,	 12;	 Lukes	2005,	 20-37).	 Ideas	 and	beliefs	 can	determine	 and	 shape	 preferences	 to	 such	 extent	 that	 it	 might	 not	 be	 necessary	 to	exercise	power	through	forcing	others.	In	other	words,	power	can	be	exercised	through	multiple	 areas	 that	 are	 interconnected,	 but	 does	 not	 necessarily	 include	 a	 conscious	
decision	to	make	others	do	what	they	would	normally	not	do.	Dahl’s	definition	of	power	
over	others	–	relating	mostly	to	Lukes’	first	dimension	of	power	–	is	the	basis	for	hard	power	and	 implies	a	certain	amount	of	 coercion	 to	get	others	 to	go	against	 their	own	will.	But	if	one	is	able	to	shape	another’s	preferences	from	the	beginning	one	might	not	need	 coercion	 to	 get	 another	 to	 do	 what	 one	 wants,	 and	 it	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	interests	 have	 to	 be	 counterproductive.	 The	 shaping	 of	 these	 preferences	 occurs	
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through	agenda	setting	persuasion	and	attraction	–	Lukes’	second	and	third	dimensions	–	and	is	based	on	soft	power	(Nye	2011,	16;	Lukes	2005,	20;	28).	1	Traditionally,	international	relations	theory	involving	power	has	mainly	been	the	intellectual	territory	of	Realist	theories	(Gallarotti	2015,	247).	However,	the	success	of	producing	 a	 preferred	 outcome	 is	 highly	 dependent	 on	 the	 resources	 used	 in	 the	strategy	 to	 pursue	 the	 outcome.	 Which	 resources	 fit	 which	 goal	 is	 in	 turn	 largely	dependent	on	the	context	and	varies	widely	(Nye	2010,	7).	A	focus	on	soft	power	might	therefore	be	better	applicable	to	certain	situations	than	hard	power.		While	this	overview	of	the	various	means	of	power	does	not	provide	us	with	an	exact	definition	of	the	term,	it	does	give	us	valuable	insight	in	the	way	in	which	power	is	operationalized.	 The	 idea	 that	 power	 can	 be	 exercised	 through	 means	 other	 than	coercion	highlights	the	importance	of	soft	power	in	its	execution.	Because	this	research	focuses	 on	 the	 use	 of	 smart	 power	 strategies	 in	 current	 foreign	 policy,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	approach	power	and	its	success	from	a	policy	perspective,	and	frame	it	as	“the	ability	to	produce	 preferred	 outcomes,”	 or	 “the	 ability	 to	 attain	 the	 outcome	 one	 wants”	 (Nye	2011,	7;	Nye	2010,	2).					 Changes	 in	 the	 international	 order	 mean	 that	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	 power	 is	being	exercised	are	changing	as	well.	The	importance	of	context	becomes	clear	when	we	take	a	closer	look	at	how	they	affect	and	change	the	nature	of	power	itself.	While	power	in	the	eighteenth	century	might	have	been	determined	by	who	had	the	best	hard	power	resources,	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	 an	 “information	 revolution”	 and	 rapid	technological	 innovation	have	produced	new	sources	of	power	(Nye	2002,	42).	Use	of	social	media	and	the	Internet,	for	instance,	can	spark	large-scale	democratic	fervor	and	undermine	totalitarian	regimes,	as	the	Arab	Spring	has	demonstrated.	Cyber	criminals	can	 do	 an	 enormous	 amount	 of	 damage	 to	 a	 country’s	 security	 by	 hacking	 into	 their	security	 system	 and	 releasing	 classified	 security	 documents.	 The	 context	 in	 which	power	is	exercised	thus	changes	and	this	affects	the	global	distribution	of	power,	mainly	for	the	United	States	whose	power	has	been	long	dependent	on	a	strong	military.	What	exactly	power	is,	depends	on	its	context	(Nye	2011,	xiv).		
																																																								1	For	a	more	detailed	overview	of	the	three	dimensions	of	power	and	their	functioning,	see	Steven	Lukes’	Power:	A	Radical	View.	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2005.		
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Smart	Power	The	 changing	 nature	 of	 power	 and	 its	 dynamism	 within	 the	 international	 system	present	 new	 challenges.	 Changing	 international	 contexts	 and	 the	 increased	transnational	nature	of	threats	demand	new	strategies	in	order	to	face	these	challenges.	In	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	 “power	 measured	 in	 resources	 rarely	 equals	 power	measured	 in	 preferred	 outcomes”	 (Nye	 2010,	 4).	 In	 a	 world	 that	 is	 increasingly	interconnected,	 the	role	of	soft	power	 increases	because	exercising	power	with	others	often	 surpasses	 power	 over	 others	 in	 its	 effectiveness	 of	 reaching	 these	 preferred	outcomes	(Nye	2002,	9).	The	ability	 to	set	 the	agenda	 in	world	politics	may	prove	 far	more	 (cost-)	 effective	 in	 a	 world	 that	 is	 becoming	 ever	 more	 interconnected	 than	showing	muscle	 through	military	means	 (Wilson	 2008,	 112).	 It	 is	 not	 so	much	 about	who	has	the	largest	amount	of	resources	anymore,	but	about	who	uses	their	resources	best	in	a	given	context.			 Joseph	 Nye	 describes	 smart	 power	 as	 “the	 combination	 of	 the	 hard	 power	 of	coercion	 and	 payment	 with	 the	 soft	 power	 of	 persuasion	 and	 attraction”	 (Nye	 2011,	xiii).	 Given	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 power,	 the	 key	 to	 the	 value	 of	 smart	 power	 as	 a	concept	in	policy-making	lies	in	its	flexibility	due	to	the	combining	of	hard	power	with	soft	 power.	 Using	 smart	 power	 as	 a	 framework	 for	 creating	 policy	 increases	policymakers’	choice	of	resources	and	allows	them	to	utilize	these	resources	in	the	most	effective	way	in	order	to	reach	a	preferred	outcome.	An	overreliance	on	either	hard	or	soft	 power	 brings	 about	 certain	 risks,	 and	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 a	 dynamic	 kind	 of	policymaking.		As	Gallarotti	argues,	“hard	power	exhibits	a	greater	conflict	of	interests	relative	to	soft	power,”	exactly	because	it	uses	coercion	to	get	someone	to	do	what	they	would	not	usually	do	(Gallarotti	2015,	250).	Soft	power,	on	the	other	hand,	tries	to	lure	others	into	 voluntarily	 doing	 what	 they	 would	 not	 usually	 do	 through	 attraction	 and	persuasion	(Ibid.,	250).	Therefore,	soft	power	displays	a	“greater	harmony	of	interests,”	as	opposed	to	hard	power’s	inherent	unequal	relationship	of	force	and	coercion	(Ibid.,	250).	The	possibility	of	collaboration	on	the	base	of	mutual	interests	makes	soft	power	a	good	fit	for	the	twenty-first	century	transnational	challenges	that	need	to	be	confronted	multilaterally,	such	as	combating	terrorism.	By	combining	hard	power	with	soft	power,	smart	power	 strategies	not	only	allow	 for	 international	 collaboration,	but	 rather	 than	focusing	 on	 one	 type	 of	 power,	 smart	 power	 “is	 about	 finding	 ways	 to	 combine	
	 9	
resources	into	successful	strategies	in	the	new	context	of	power	diffusion	and	the	"rise	of	the	rest"	(Nye	2011,	207-8).		Smart	power	provides	a	valuable	framework	for	the	creation	of	current	foreign	policy.	 Looking	 at	 foreign	 policy	 through	 a	 smart	 power	 lens	 allows	 policymakers	 to	approach	policy	from	a	more	flexible	perspective,	combining	the	resources	available	in	order	to	tailor	a	strategy	to	its	context.	Through	acknowledging	the	shift	in	context	and	nature	 of	 power,	 smart	 power	 strategies	 also	 take	 into	 account	 the	 changing	 global	balance	of	power.	It	accounts	for	the	increase	in	influence	among	non-traditional	states	such	as	 the	BRICS	and	other	 countries	after	 the	 collapse	of	Cold	War	power	 relations	(Wilson	 2008,	 113).	 The	 incorporation	 of	 the	 flexible	 and	 changing	 nature	 of	 the	international	 system	 –	 the	 nature	 of	 power,	 areas	 of	 power,	 and	 global	 balances	 of	power	 –	 lead	 smart	 power	 to	 provide	 a	 valuable	 framework	 for	 tackling	 twenty-first	century	transnational	challenges,	and	the	use	of	all	possible	power	resources	to	do	so.		An	increasingly	smart	world	demands	an	increasingly	smart	foreign	policy.				
National	security	strategy:	the	basis	for	smart	power	The	 embrace	 of	 smart	 power	 as	 the	 leading	 foreign	 policy	 strategy	 of	 the	 Obama	administration	 was	 reiterated	 in	 the	 2015	 National	 Security	 Strategy	 (NSS).	 The	document	ties	the	smart	power	concept	to	more	concrete	policy	goals.	In	the	2015	NSS,	President	Obama	laid	out	an	explicit	smart	power	strategy:			 “We	will	 lead	with	 all	 the	 instruments	 of	 U.S.	 power.	 Our	 influence	 is	 greatest	when	we	combine	all	our	strategic	advantages.	Our	military	will	remain	ready	to	defend	our	enduring	national	interests	while	providing	essential	leverage	for	our	diplomacy.	The	use	of	force	is	not,	however,	the	only	tool	at	our	disposal,	and	it	is	not	the	principal	means	of	U.S.	engagement	broad,	nor	always	the	most	effective	for	the	challenges	we	face.”	(NSS	2015,	4)		During	Obama’s	presidency,	the	focus	of	American	policy	shifted	away	from	the	use	of	force	 that	 was	 dominant	 under	 the	 previous	 George	 W.	 Bush	 administration	 and	towards	 an	 increase	 in	 diplomacy	 (NSS	 2015).	 Yet	 it	 is	 the	 combination	 of	 force	 and	diplomacy	 –	 of	 hard	 and	 soft	 power	 –	 and	 the	 strategic	 choice	 of	 resources	 out	 of	 a	range	of	options,	depending	on	what	fits	a	specific	situation	best,	that	embraces	smart	
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power	 as	 the	 basis	 on	which	 to	 formulate	 American	 foreign	 policy	 responses.	 “I	 will	continue	to	pursue	a	comprehensive	agenda	that	draws	on	all	elements	of	our	national	strength,	 that	 is	 attuned	 to	 the	 strategic	 risks	 and	 opportunities	we	 face,	 and	 that	 is	guided	 by	 the	 principles	 and	 priorities	 set	 out	 in	 this	 strategy,”	 states	 Obama	 in	 the	introduction	of	the	2015	National	Security	Strategy	(NSS	2015,	ii).		In	 order	 to	 examine	 how	 the	 conversion	 of	 the	 smart	 power	 concept	 and	security	strategy	into	practice	works,	the	following	two	chapters	will	examine	American	policy	formation	for	the	Ukraine	crisis	and	the	South	China	Sea	conflict.			
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The	United	States’	response	to	the	Ukraine	crisis		In	 November	 2013,	 Ukraine	 descended	 into	 chaos	 after	 former	 President	 Viktor	Yanukovych	 refused	 to	 sign	 the	 long-anticipated	 Association	 Agreement	 with	 the	European	 Union.	 The	 period	marked	 a	 succession	 of	 mass	 protests	 in	 Kiev’s	 Maidan	Square	 in	 February	 2014,	 eventually	 resulting	 in	 the	 ousting	 of	 the	 Yanukovych	government.	 A	 new,	 pro-European	 opposition	 government	 led	 by	 Petro	 Poroshenko	took	control	on	21	February	2014.	Yanukovych	fled	to	Russia,	but	continued	to	regard	himself	 the	 lawful	President	of	Ukraine.	 In	 turn,	contrary	 to	 the	EU	and	United	States,	Russia	 did	 not	 accept	 Ukraine’s	 new	 government,	 and	 considered	 Yankukovych’	removal	 a	 coup	 d’état.	 Early	 March	 2014,	 Russian	 forces	 took	 over	 the	 Crimean	peninsula,	 and	 with	 that	 Ukrainian	 territory.	 Crimea	 was	 officially	 annexed	 into	 the	Russian	Federation	on	March	18,	2014.		The	Russian	invasion	took	the	world	by	surprise,	and	generated	harsh	backlash	across	 the	 international	 community.	The	United	States	and	members	of	 the	European	Union	immediately	denounced	Putin’s	actions,	marking	them	as	acts	of	aggression.	The	annexation	of	foreign	territory	marks	a	breach	of	the	concepts	of	state	sovereignty	and	nonintervention	as	laid	down	in	international	law.	After	more	than	two	years,	however,	there	is	still	no	solution	to	the	conflict.	At	the	same	time	in	which	Crimea	was	annexed	into	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 pro-Russian	 separatists	 annexed	 parts	 of	 the	 Donbass	region	 in	 Eastern	 Ukraine.	 Despite	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Minsk-II	 accord	 on	 11	February	 2015,	 fighting	 continues	 between	 the	 Ukrainian	 army	 and	 the	 self	 declared	Luhansk	People’s	Republic	and	Donetsk	People’s	Republic.		The	 United	 States’	 foreign	 policy	 strategy	 implemented	 after	 the	 Russian	annexation	of	Crimea	has	been	based	mainly	on	a	strategy	of	payment.	It	has	consisted	of	sanctions	against	Russia,	military	aid	through	the	increase	of	NATO	forces	in	Eastern	European	 countries,	 as	 well	 as	 suspension	 of	 bilateral	 cooperation	 and	 projects	scheduled	 for	 the	U.S.-Russia	Bilateral	Presidential	Commission	(Morelli	2016,	20-21).	In	addition,	the	United	States	has	provided	financial	aid	to	Ukraine	and	has	increased	its	attention	 for	 European	 energy	 security,	 in	 order	 to	 try	 and	 make	 European	 Union	members	less	dependent	on	Russian	oil	and	gas	(McMahon	2014).			
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American	interests	in	Ukraine		The	main	American	interests	in	Ukraine	regard	European	security.	Russia’s	invasion	of	Ukraine	and	its	subsequent	annexation	of	Crimea	is	the	second	occurrence	of	large	use	of	 force	 across	 borders	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 territory	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	following	the	invasion	of	Georgia	in	2008.		Russia’s	 behavior	 poses	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 post-Cold	 War	 European	 status	 quo,	based	on	concepts	of	liberal	internationalism	and	international	law,	territorial	integrity	and	state	sovereignty	(Mankoff	and	Kuchins	2015,	4).	 John	J.	Mearsheimer	has	argued	that	 overreliance	 on	 the	 American	 liberal	 worldview	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 failure	 to	recognize	geopolitical	triggers	that	would	set	Russia	off,	mainly	the	NATO	enlargement	and	 expansion	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 EU’s	 Eastern	 Partnership	 program	occurring	 during	 the	 1990s.	 While	 interpreted	 as	 benign	 by	 the	 West,	 Russia	 has	perceived	the	increased	NATO	and	EU	expansion	into	former	Soviet	territory	as	a	major	security	threat	(van	Wijk	2016,	139;	Mearsheimer	2014,	77;	Mankoff	and	Kuchins	2015,	6).		 In	 similar	 fashion,	 Walter	 Russell	 Mead	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 West	 has	misinterpreted	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 ending	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 and	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	USSR:	 “[it	 meant]	 the	 ideological	 triumph	 of	 liberal	 capitalist	 democracy	 over	communism,	not	the	obsolescence	of	hard	power”	(Mead	2014,	69;	van	Wijk	2016,	146).	American	 Secretary	 of	 State	 John	Kerry	 reacted	 to	 the	Crimean	 annexation	by	 stating	that	“you	just	don’t	 in	the	twenty-first	century	behave	in	a	nineteenth-century	fashion	by	 invading	 another	 country	 on	 completely	 trumped-up	pretext”	 (Mearsheimer	2014,	84).	While	the	dominant	view	in	Washington	seems	to	hold	that	geopolitics	are	a	thing	of	the	past,	Moscow	continues	to	perceive	the	world	according	to	a	Realist	perception	in	which	power	politics	remains	dominant	(Mearsheimer	2014,	84;	Kotkin	2016,	8).	These	adverse	 perceptions	 can	 result	 in	 geopolitical	 misunderstandings	 with	 large	consequences,	as	the	annexation	of	Crimea	has	demonstrated.		The	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	 poses	 not	 only	 a	 geopolitical	 but	 also	 a	 more	ideological	threat	to	the	American	led	international	liberal	world	order.	It	challenges	the	core	notions	 on	which	 the	 order	 is	 built	 and	 according	 to	which	 it	 functions,	 thereby	adding	 an	 ideological	 power	 consideration	 to	 the	 conflict.	 Russia’s	 increasingly	aggressive	stance	in	the	international	environment	has	subsequently	led	to	a	refocus	of	American	 attention.	While	 the	United	 States	 has	 tried	 to	 shift	 its	 foreign	 policy	 focus	
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increasingly	 to	 Asia,	 Russian	 behavior	 has	 forced	 the	 United	 States’	 attention	 to	European	security	once	again	(Mankoff	and	Kuchins	2015,	4;	National	Security	Strategy,	2015).			
American	policy	regarding	the	Ukraine	conflict	The	backbone	of	 the	American	response	to	Russia’s	annexation	of	Crimea	 in	2014	has	been	multilaterally	 based	 sanctions.	 These	 sanctions	 have	 included	 asset	 freezes	 and	travel	bans	on	persons	associated	with	the	Ukrainian	destabilization	and	Putin’s	 inner	circle	(Ashford	2016,	114;	Morelli	2016,	ii,	16).	After	the	crash	of	Malaysia	Airlines	flight	MH17	in	Ukraine	on	17	July	2014,	tensions	between	Russia	and	the	West	increased	even	further.	 Supposedly	 shot	down	by	pro-Russian	separatists	 in	Eastern	Ukraine,	using	a	Russian-supplied	 BUK	missile,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 European	 Union	 expanded	 their	sanctions	against	Russia.	New	sanctions	 targeted	key	sectors	of	 the	Russian	economy,	such	as	arms	manufacturers,	banks,	and	state-led	firms	(Ashford	2016,	114).		According	 to	Vincent	Morelli,	 the	United	 States	 implemented	 sanctions	 against	Russia	 “in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 cost	 to	Russia	 of	 its	 aggression,	with	 the	objective	of	pressing	 it	 to	 implement	 a	 genuine	 political	 settlement	 with	 Ukraine”	 (Morelli	 2016,	20).	Sanctions	are	a	means	of	payment.	By	 targeting	Russia’s	economy,	 the	aim	of	 the	United	States	and	the	European	Union	has	been	to	force	Russia	into	a	political	solution	in	the	Ukraine	crisis.	But	so	far,	the	sanctions	have	not	been	very	effective	if	their	goal	was	to	achieve	a	policy	change	on	Russia’s	side.	According	to	Emma	Ashford,	“when	the	sanctions	are	judged	by	the	most	relevant	metric	–	whether	they	are	producing	a	policy	change	–	they	have	been	an	outright	failure”	(Ashford	2016,	115).	So	far,	the	sanctions	have	failed	to	coerce	Russia	into	the	outcome	preferred	by	the	United	States:	a	peaceful,	political	settlement	with	Ukraine	that	respects	the	ideas	of	non-invasion	and	territorial	integrity.	In	other	words:	ideas	underlying	the	liberal	world	order.	From	the	more	 ideological	perspective	of	democracy	promotion	and	the	norms	and	values	promoted	by	the	United	States,	it	could	even	be	argued	that	American	policy	towards	the	Ukraine	crisis	has	been	counterproductive.	The	annexation	of	Ukraine	and	the	subsequent	military	intervention	in	Syria	have	produced	a	boost	in	Putin’s	approval	ratings,	which	have	skyrocketed	to	88	percent	(Pew	Research	Center,	poll2).	Putin	has																																																									2	See	Appendix	1	
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made	 clever	 use	 of	 the	 sanctions	 imposed	 on	 Russia	 by	 the	 United	 States	 and	 EU	 by	utilizing	them	in	his	anti-Western	narrative	(Ashford	2016,	120;	Mankoff	and	Kuchins	2015,	1,	6).		The	economic	 sanctions,	 however,	 have	produced	a	major	blow	 to	 the	Russian	economy.	Coinciding	with	a	 sharp	decline	 in	oil	prices	and	 lack	of	 coherent	 economic	policy,	the	value	of	the	ruble	has	dropped	dramatically.	Russia	is	now	facing	structural	economic	 deterioration,	 a	 process	 that	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 come	 to	 a	 halt	 in	 the	 near	future	(Mankoff	and	Kuchins	2015,	1).				A	second	measure	taken	by	Washington	has	been	increased	attention	to	NATO.	In	response	to	the	annexation	of	Crimea,	the	United	States	has	focused	its	attention	on	Europe’s	military	security.	Washington	reiterated	its	commitments	to	NATO	at	the	2014	NATO	 summit	 in	Wales,	 and	 has	 subsequently	 supported	 the	 stationing	 of	 additional	NATO	 troops	 in	 Eastern	Europe,	mainly	 in	 Poland	 and	 the	Baltic	 states	 (Mankoff	 and	Kuchins	2015,	4).	Since	Ukraine	is	not	a	NATO	member,	the	United	States	does	not	have	to	provide	the	direct	protection	guaranteed	to	all	NATO	member	states	under	Article	5.	This	 military	 focused	 policy	 strategy	 seems	 to	 be	 aimed	 at	 sending	 a	 signal	 and	deterring	 Russia,	 without	 engaging	 in	 a	 true	 military	 standoff.	 So	 far	 the	 U.S.	government	 has	 refused	 to	 supply	 lethal	 arms	 or	 direct	 military	 assistance	 within	Ukraine’s	borders.	This	has	proven	to	be	beneficial	for	Washington,	which	does	not	wish	to	fully	antagonize	Moscow.		A	third	aspect	of	the	foreign	policy	strategy	has	been	political	and	economic.	The	United	States	have	provided	financial	aid	to	Ukraine,	and	have	supported	other	efforts	that	do	so,	such	as	the	$17	billion	IMF	loan	(McMahon	2014).	 	Providing	economic	aid	on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 promise	 of	 political	 reforms	 allows	 the	United	 States	 and	 the	 EU	 to	counter	pro-Russian	forces	and	push	Ukraine	more	towards	Europe	(Morelli	2016,	21).	While	the	IMF	loan	seemed	to	have	produced	financial	stability	in	the	country	in	2015,	actual	reforms	have	been	slow,	something	that	has	not	escaped	American	attention.	In	April	2016,	Vice-President	Biden	emphasized	the	importance	of	the	implementation	of	the	 Ukrainian	 reform	 program	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Minsk-II	 agreement	 in	 order	 to	 secure	continued	 international	 support	 (Morelli	 2016,	 22).	 The	 United	 States	 itself	 has	provided	almost	$1	billion	in	loans	to	Ukraine.	This	economic	aid	is	aimed	at	a	range	of	issues,	 such	 as	 financial	 stability,	 promoting	 independent	 media,	 strengthening	 civil	society,	and	constitutional	reforms	(Ibid.,	22).		
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Smart	power	in	United	States’	Ukraine	policy	 	In	order	to	assess	American	policy	it	is	important	to	understand	the	context	in	which	it	has	 been	 constructed.	 The	 geopolitical	 situation	 determines	 the	 amount	 of	 space	policymakers	 have	 to	 craft	 an	 effective	 and	 viable	 policy.	 It	 is	 therefore	 useful	 to	consider	 the	 policy	 options	 that	 have	 not	 been	 implemented	 and	 which	 have	 been	discarded.		While	 the	 United	 States	 has	 increased	 its	 attention	 to	 NATO,	 it	 has	 decided	against	pursuing	further	military	involvement.	There	have	been	repeated	calls	for	arms	supplies	 by	 the	Ukrainian	 government,	 but	 so	 far	 the	United	 States	has	 refused	 these	requests	(Herbst	and	Rojansky,	2016).	Other	military	focused	policy	options	regarding	the	 Ukraine	 crisis	 include	 active	 countering	 of	 Russia’s	 military	 modernization	 and	granting	Ukraine	NATO	membership	(Ashford	2016,	115,	122;	Pifer	2015).		As	with	the	option	of	arms	supply,	both	of	these	options	have	also	not	been	implemented.	The	 refusal	 of	 providing	weapons	 to	 the	 Ukrainian	 army	 by	 the	 United	 States	government	 shows	 that	 geopolitical	 considerations	 are	 taken	 into	 account.	While	 the	policy	 strategy	 of	 sanctions	 and	 financial	 aid	 to	Ukraine	 covers	 both	 ends	 of	 possible	economic	measures	–	payment	as	well	as	attraction	–	militarily,	 the	United	States	has	been	 more	 careful.	 Both	 the	 provision	 of	 weapons	 to	 the	 Ukrainian	 army	 and	 the	possibility	of	Ukrainian	NATO	membership	would	antagonize	Moscow,	something	that	is	being	avoided	by	the	United	States.		 The	United	States	has	actively	tried	to	separate	the	Ukraine	conflict	 from	other	affairs	 in	 order	 to	 continue	 cooperation	 with	 Russia	 on	 mutual	 security	 interests	elsewhere	 in	 the	world	 (Mankoff	 and	 Kuchins	 2015,	 5).	 Mutual	 U.S.-Russian	 security	interests	 include	 combating	 terrorism,	 cooperating	 on	 the	 Iran	 Deal	 and	 nuclear	nonproliferation	 (Einhorn	 2016).	 The	 necessity	 for	 Russian	 support	 in	 other	 security	areas	is	one	of	the	reasons	the	United	States	has	refused	to	take	a	tougher	stand	against	Russia	over	Ukraine.	Few	security	issues,	especially	in	the	area	of	nuclear	proliferation,	can	 be	 dealt	 with	 without	 Russia,	 for	 “without	 Russia’s	 active	 support	 or	 at	 least	acquiescence,	 […]	 Moscow	 is	 often	 well-positioned	 to	 play	 a	 spoiler	 role	 (Einhorn,	2016).	 Ukraine,	 as	 dire	 as	 the	 situation	 is,	 is	 simply	 not	 one	 of	 Washington’s	 vital	interests	in	a	world	dominated	by	both	inter-state	and	transnational	security	challenges	such	as	terrorism	and	nuclear	proliferation,	in	which	Russian	assistance	is	necessary.			
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So	how	“smart”	was	the	foreign	policy	implemented	after	the	Russian	annexation	of	Crimea	 in	 terms	of	combining	hard	and	soft	power?	 If	 the	goal	of	American	 foreign	policy	regarding	the	Ukraine	crisis	and	the	annexation	of	Crimea	was	to	force	Russia	to	a	political	solution	for	the	conflict,	 the	policy	has	 indeed	failed	dramatically.	But	given	the	current	geopolitical	context	and	the	necessity	of	cooperation	with	Russia	on	other	issues	 such	as	 terrorism	and	nuclear	nonproliferation,	 the	policy	has	not	been	half	 as	bad.	 It	 has	 dealt	 a	 considerable	 blow	 to	 the	 Russian	 economy	 without	 antagonizing	Russia	to	a	point	in	which	cooperation	is	completely	impossible.		Since	the	main	resources	used	to	execute	the	strategy	–	sanctions	and	increase	of	NATO	forces	–	have	been	used	as	a	means	of	payment	and	deterrence,	the	strategy	has	been	mostly	based	on	hard	power.	However,	given	the	range	of	resources	and	options	the	 United	 States	 has,	 so	 far	 it	 seems	 they	 have	 carefully	 considered	 which	 options	would	be	most	effective	in	signaling	discontent	with	Russia’s	aggression	without	losing	a	window	for	cooperative	engagement.	This	has	mainly	been	visible	in	the	relative	lack	of	 American	 military	 involvement.	 With	 the	 employment	 of	 mainly	 economic	 and	diplomatic	rather	than	military	hard	power	tactics	Washington	has	kept	the	diplomatic	line	to	Moscow	open,	through	which	it	has	been	able	to	negotiate	settlements	in	other	conflicts,	such	as	the	February	2016	joint	statement	on	the	Syrian	ceasefire	(Lukyanov	2016,	30).			 In	order	to	fully	understand	the	relationship	between	hard	and	soft	power	tactics	and	 their	 combinations	 it	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 broader	American	policy	towards	Russia	and	its	various	interests	throughout	the	world,	and	not	solely	 focus	 on	 the	 specific	 resources	 utilized	 in	 the	 Ukraine	 Crisis.	 Looking	 at	 the	broader	 context,	 Washington	 has	 combined	 coercive	 methods	 of	 payment	 through	sanctions	regarding	the	situation	in	Ukraine	with	continued	diplomatic	efforts	in	other	policy	areas.	This	strategy	of	combining	hard	and	soft	power	resources	thus	seems	to	be	relatively	successful	in	voicing	discontent	with	Russia	over	Ukraine	and	supporting	pro-democratic	 reforms	within	Ukraine,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	maintaining	dialogue	 and	cooperation	with	Russia	in	regions	other	than	the	post-Soviet	space.		
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American	Foreign	Policy	in	the	South	China	Sea	Conflict	
	In	 recent	 years,	 tensions	 have	 flared	 up	 once	 again	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea.	 While	 a	centuries	 old	 source	 of	 rivalry,	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 China	 has	 become	 increasingly	assertive	 about	 its	 territorial	 claims	 to	 the	 area.	 At	 the	 core	 of	 the	 conflict	 are	 the	disputed	 claims	 of	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 various	 countries	 surrounding	 the	 South	 China	Sea.	 China,	Taiwan,	Vietnam,	 the	Philippines,	Malaysia	 and	Brunei	 all	 claim	 their	 own	territorial	 rights	 to	 parts	 of	 the	 area	 (McDevitt	 2013,	 175).	 The	 conflicting	 territorial	claims	 and	 lack	 of	 a	 coherent	 legal	 framework	 to	 solve	 the	 disputes	 continue	 to	 fuel	already	existing	tensions	in	the	area.			 The	area	concerned	consists	not	only	of	sea	but	also	of	 the	Paracel	and	Spratly	island	 groups,	 as	 well	 as	 many	 small	 reefs,	 atolls	 and	 sandbanks.	 China	 claims	 large	parts	of	the	South	China	Sea	on	the	basis	of	historical	assertions.	Its	claims	are	based	on	an	 old,	 1947	 map,	 which	 displays	 a	 U-shaped	 area	 defined	 as	 the	 ‘nine-dashed	 line	(McDevitt	 2013,	 176).	 Practically	 covering	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 South	 China	 Sea,	 China	claims	sovereignty	of	the	area.	Other	countries,	such	as	Vietnam,	dispute	China’s	claims	by	 arguing	 that	 there	 is	 historical	 evidence	 supporting	 their	 own	 rule	 of	 the	 islands	before	1947.	The	Philippines	contests	China’s	claims	and	pursues	its	own	by	arguing	the	proximity	 of	 the	 Spratly	 islands.	 One	 important	 reason	 for	 continued	 claims	 on	 the	islands	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 large	 hydrocarbon	 reserves.	 Hydrocarbon	 extraction	 could	provide	the	various	countries	with	large	energy	revenues.				 The	situation	 is	 further	complicated	due	 to	 the	complexity	of	 international	 law	regarding	maritime	territories,	resulting	in	a	lack	of	legal	clarity	and	therefore	gridlock.	The	1982	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	holds	that	“any	sovereign	 feature	above	water	at	high	 tide	 is	 surrounded	by	a	12-nautical-mile	water	column,	 known	 as	 its	 territorial	 sea,	 which	 endows	 the	 state	 possessing	 sovereignty	with	 the	 resources	 within	 its	 territorial	 sea”	 (McDevitt	 2013,	 183).	 The	 UNCLOS	document	 specifically	mentions	 reefs,	 atolls,	 and	 “low-tide	 elevations”	 as	 the	 baseline	for	measuring	territorial	waters	(UNCLOS	1982,	Article	6;	13).	UNCLOS	also	determined	the	 right	of	 countries	 to	 exploit	 the	 resources	within	200	nautical	miles	beyond	 their	12-nautical-mile	 territorial	 sea.	 These	 areas	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 country’s	 Exclusive	Economic	Zone	(EEZ).		
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	 The	EEZs	of	the	various	countries	lie	at	the	core	of	the	conflict	in	the	South	China	Sea	and	 the	claims	of	 surrounding	countries.	Due	 to	 the	 relatively	 small	 area,	overlap	exists	 between	 the	 different	 EEZs	 and	 China’s	 nine-dash-line.	 While	 an	 International	Tribunal	for	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(ITLOS)	does	exist,	not	a	lot	of	countries	involved	in	the	conflict	 decide	 to	 take	 their	 claims	 there	 (McDevitt	 2013,	 183).	 China’s	 rejection	 of	ITLOS’	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	South	China	Sea	discourages	other	countries	 to	make	use	of	the	mechanism.	 So	 far,	 only	 the	 Philippines	 has	 initiated	 an	 arbitration	 case	 through	ITLOS	 against	 China’s	 claims	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea.	3	Since	 ITLOS	 can	 be	 considered	part	of	the	international	liberal	order	that	the	United	States	upholds	and	China	rejects,	Manila’s	decision	to	file	its	case	for	international	arbitration	despite	Chinese	objections	can	be	seen	as	a	victory	for	the	United	States	as	well	as	the	Philippines	itself.	While	the	Philippines	won	the	arbitration	case	on	12	July	2016,	it	 is	unlikely	that	this	ruling	will	lead	 to	 change	 due	 to	 China’s	 opposition	 to	 ITLOS	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 matter.	 China	regards	the	nine-dash-line	area	as	sovereign	territory,	not	 international	waters,	and	is	therefore	of	the	opinion	that	UNCLOS	does	not	apply	there.		 			 In	recent	years,	China	has	been	increasingly	aggressive	towards	its	claims	in	the	South	China	Sea.	It	has	created	artificial	 land	areas	in	the	Spratlys	in	order	to	build	an	airstrip,	 and	 in	 early	 2016	 positioned	 anti-ship	 cruise	 missiles	 (ASCMs)	 on	 Woody	Island,	one	of	the	disputed	Paracel	islands.4	The	South	China	Sea	is	important	for	China’s	security,	 for	 it	 provides	 a	 screen	 for	 its	 southern	 sea-border.	 It	 is	 also	 the	 most	important	Chinese	trade	route,	and	exploitation	of	the	hydrocarbon	reserves	in	the	area	would	 make	 China	 less	 energy	 dependent	 on	 African	 and	 Persian	 Gulf	 oil	 (McDevitt	2013,	181).		
																																																								3	The	Philippines,	for	one,	has	filed	a	case	against	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	at	ITLOS	under	Annex	VII	of	UNCLOS	on	22	January	2013.	Thereby,	the	Philippines	has	initiated	international	arbitration	through	international	law	based	on	UNCLOS.	China,	however,	refuses	to	participate	and	has	rejected	the	Philippines’	claims.	While	it	is	not	clear	if	the	U.S.	pushed	the	Philippines	to	seek	out	international	arbitration,	the	U.S.	does	consider	the	outcome	of	the	arbitration	case	binding	(Batongbacal	2015).	In	October	2015	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	established	that	it	has	jurisdiction	over	some	of	the	claims.	(CFR,	On:	http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345).	A	ruling	in	the	case	is	expected	on	July	12,	2016	(Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	Press	Release;	On:	http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1782).		4	See	CNN,	18	February	2016.	On:	http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/16/asia/china-missiles-south-china-sea/	
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Since	 2010,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 displayed	 renewed	 interest	 in	 Asia.	 The	 so-called	Rebalance	to	Asia,	or	Asia	Pivot,	entails	a	renewed	focus	on,	and	distribution	of	resources	to,	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	The	South	China	Sea	has	proven	a	source	of	major	disagreement	 between	 China	 and	 the	United	 States.	While	 the	United	 States	 officially	does	not	get	involved	into	issues	of	sovereignty,	it	reacts	strongly	to	China’s	hindering	of	 the	 freedom	 of	 navigation	 as	 embedded	 in	 international	 law.	Washington	 is	 of	 the	opinion	 that	 Beijing	 tries	 to	 obstruct	 freedom	 of	 navigation,	 while	 Beijing	 considers	American	Freedom	of	Navigation	operations	(FONOPS)	this	close	to	the	Chinese	border	hostile	activities.				
	
U.S.	interests	in	the	South	China	Sea	The	U.S.	has	various	interests	in	the	South	China	Sea	area.	Not	only	is	it	an	area	through	which	more	 than	 $5	 trillion	 in	 trade	moves	 every	 year,	 but	 there	 are	 also	 aspects	 of	regional	security	and	geopolitical	considerations	that	are	important	to	the	United	States	(Glaser	2016,	3).			 According	to	the	Center	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies	(CSIS),	the	United	States	 has	 three	 main	 interests	 in	 South	 East	 Asia:	 protecting	 the	 security	 of	 the	American	 people	 and	 allies,	 the	 expansion	 of	 trade,	 and	 backing	 democratic	 norms	(Green	 et.	 al.	 2016,	 10).	 These	 interests	 reflect	 those	 of	 the	 broader	 aims	 of	 the	Asia	Pivot,	as	laid	out	by	Hillary	Clinton	in	2011.		Clinton	states	that	the	United	States	needs	to	“put	ourselves	in	the	best	position	to	sustain	our	leadership,	secure	our	interests,	and	advance	our	values”	(Clinton	2011,	1).	The	main	issues	interests	involved	in	the	region	are	 regional	 and	 global	 security	 and	 economic	 cooperation	 (Clinton	 2011,	 7).	 To	increase	American	security,	one	aspect	towards	which	foreign	policy	has	been	directed	is	 prevention	of	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 hostile	Asian	hegemonic	power	 (Ibid.,	 10).	 The	 rise	 of	 a	hostile	Asian	hegemon	could	thwart	the	broader	U.S.	interests	in	the	region,	also	due	to	defense	agreements	between	the	United	States	and	various	Asian	countries.			 An	 important	development	within	Asia	 in	 the	past	decade	has	been	 the	 rise	of	China.	 China’s	 increasingly	 aggressive	 territorial	 claims	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 have	increased	American	concerns	about	the	possibility	of	a	hostile	Asian	hegemon.	Tensions	between	China	and	its	neighbors,	many	of	which	are	U.S.	allies,	over	claims	in	the	South	China	Sea	raise	difficulties	for	U.S.	policymakers.	The	conflict	in	the	South	China	Sea	and	the	 United	 States’	 support	 for	 smaller	 regional	 players	 such	 as	 the	 Philippines	 and	
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Vietnam	–	who	have	similar	claims	in	the	South	China	Sea	-	puts	the	U.S.-Sino	bilateral	relationship	at	risk.	Having	access	to	the	South	China	Sea	cut	off	could	cost	the	Untied	States	 billions	 in	 trade	 income	 annually.	 Continued	 access	 to	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 is	therefore	 paramount.	 The	 task	 that	 U.S.	 policymakers	 face	 is	 therefore	 twofold:	supporting	U.S.	 interests	and	allies	without	antagonizing	China	 in	the	process	(Brooks	and	Wohlforth	 2016,	 101).	 For	 despite	 its	 many	 disagreements,	 deterioration	 of	 the	U.S.-China	bilateral	relation	could	damage	cooperation	on	transnational	challenges	such	as	terrorism,	climate	change,	epidemics,	piracy	and	security,	especially	regarding	North	Korean	nuclear	proliferation	(Glaser	2015,	3;	Green	et.	al.	2016,	27).				 All	these	interests	revolve	not	only	around	tangible	results	but	also	have	a	lot	to	do	 with	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 democratic	 values	 underlying	 the	 liberal	 international	order	 and	 the	American	position	on	 the	world	 stage.	American	 interests	 in	 the	 South	China	 Sea	 conflict	 are	 not	 so	 much	 about	 the	 islands	 and	 reefs	 itself	 but	 about	 the	consequences	 for	 “the	 wider	 order”	 (Brooks	 and	 Wohlforth	 2016,	 103).	 China’s	aggressive	pursuit	of	its	territorial	claims	in	the	South	China	Sea	displays	its	disregard	for,	and	poses	problems	to,	the	universal	validity	and	applicability	of	international	law,	sovereignty,	and	territorial	integrity.	For	the	United	States,	the	South	China	Sea	conflict	therefore	 also	 challenges	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	world	 order	 that	 the	 United	 States	 so	vigorously	 helped	 building	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Second	World	War	 	 –	 and	 indirectly	United	States’	credibility	 in	the	Asia-Pacific.	While	the	United	States	officially	does	not	take	sides	regarding	the	various	sovereignty	claims,	resolving	these	disputes	according	to	international	law	is	a	main	U.S.	interest	(Glaser	2015,	3;	McDevitt	2015,	26).		
	
United	States	South	China	Sea	Policy		American	policy	 towards	 the	Asia	 Pacific	 consists	 of	 various	 aspects,	 one	 of	 the	most	important	of	which	is	an	increase	in	American	military	capability	within	the	region.	In	accordance	 with	 the	 “challenges	 of	 today’s	 rapidly	 changing	 region”	 announced	 in	Clinton’s	piece	on	the	Asia	Pivot,	the	CSIS	states	that,	“one	of	the	most	visible	elements	of	 the	rebalance	 [to	Asia]	has	been	 the	shift	 in	U.S.	military	 force	posture	both	within	and	 to	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region”	 (Green	 et.	 al.	 2016,	 32;	 Clinton	 2011,	 13).	 Increase	 in	military	 posture	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region	 clearly	 signals	 discontent	 to	 China,	 while	simultaneously	reassuring	various	Asian	allies	of	United	States’	support.		
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Recent	 developments	 in	Chinese	military	policy	 regarding	 the	 South	China	 Sea	have	 also	 contributed	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 United	 States’	 military	 posture.	 China’s	development	of	anti-access/area	denial	(A2/AD)	capabilities	–	which	China	itself	refers	to	 as	 “counter-intervention	 operations”	 –	 and	 strategy	 has	 increased	 U.S.	 concerns	regarding	 the	 South	 China	 Sea.	 The	main	 goal	 of	 A2/AD	 capabilities	 is	 to	 “restrict	 or	outright	 deny	 an	 attacker	 freedom	 of	 entry	 or	 maneuver”	 (Green	 et.	 al.	 2016,	 116).	China’s	A2/AD	resources	include	advanced	missile	defense	systems,	aerial	and	maritime	defense	capabilities,	as	well	as	cyber	and	space	technologies	(Cheng	2013,	Green	et.	al.	2016,	116).	 Increase	in	mainly	U.S.	maritime	capabilities	to	the	Asia-Pacific	region	has	been	a	reaction	to	China’s	A2/AD	policy.		In	response	to	 increased	tensions	 in	the	South	China	Sea,	 the	United	States	has	conducted	many	military	presence	 activities.	 These	 activities	 include	 the	use	 of	 naval	ships	 for	 various	Freedom	of	Navigation	operations	 (FONOPs),	 in	 order	 to	 emphasize	the	 right	 to	 free	 passage	 in	 international	 waters	 (Brooks	 and	 Wohlforth	 2016,	 103;	Glaser	2015,	3).	 	 In	 reaction	 to	China’s	A2/AD	capabilities	 the	United	States	 launched	the	AirSea	Battle	(ASB)	concept,	focused	on	integrating	air,	land,	and	naval	capabilities	in	order	to	counter	threats	to	freedom	of	maneuver.		The	main	 emphasis	 of	 United	 States	 policy	 regarding	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 has	been	on	compliance	with	international	law	(McDevitt	2015,	25;	Blinken	2016).	The	use	of	military	resources	supports	American	conceptions	of	international	law	and	freedom	of	international	waters.	The	United	States	wants	China	to	abide	by	UNCLOS.5	Any	claim	to	sovereignty	should	be	tied	to	territorial	features	as	set	forth	by	international	law.	The	United	States	do	not	recognize	China’s	nine-dash	line	argument,	as	it	is	not	based	on	the	principles	 of	 territorial	 sovereignty	 and	 maritime	 rights	 established	 in	 international	law.	Therefore,	there	has	been	much	support	for	smaller	countries	that	want	to	improve	their	maritime	abilities	in	order	to	better	control	and	patrol	their	own	EEZs.	There	has	also	 been	U.S.	 support	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 (COC)	 between	 the																																																									5	This	wish	stems	from	China’s	ratification	of	UNCLOS.	The	United	States	itself,	however,	has	not	ratified	the	convention,	something	that	poses	problems	regarding	its	legitimacy	and	stance	on	the	matter.	President	Obama	has	clearly	articulated	this	issue:	“We	can’t	try	to	resolve	problems	in	the	South	China	Sea	when	we	have	refused	to	make	sure	that	the	Law	of	the	Sea	Convention	is	ratified	by	our	United	States	Senate.”	See	“Remarks	by	
the	President	at	the	United	States	Military	Academy	Commencement	Ceremony,	May	28,	
2014.”	On:	https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony	
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various	 countries	 surrounding	 the	 South	 China	 Sea,	 but	 so	 far	 there	 have	 been	 no	successful	 efforts	 to	 establish	 one.	 A	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 could	 “promote	 a	 rules-based	framework	for	managing	and	regulating	the	behavior	of	relevant	countries,”	(McDevitt	2015,	 26;	 Glaser	 2015,	 3).	 Adding	 to	 the	 focus	 on	 international	 law	 is	 the	 American	urgency	 for	 the	 solution	 of	 disputes	 according	 to	 internationally	 recognized	 dispute	instruments.			Another	 aspect	 of	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 policy	 has	 been	 the	 reiteration	 of	 the	various	defense	agreements	the	United	States	has	with	countries	in	the	region	(Blinken	2016).	 Currently,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 bilateral	 defense	 treaties	 with	 Japan,	 the	Philippines,	 and	 South	 Korea,	 a	 trilateral	 defense	 agreement	with	 Australia	 and	 New	Zealand,	 and	 a	 multilateral	 defense	 treaty	 with	 Thailand	 under	 the	 South	 East	 Asia	Treaty	of	1954.6			Steps	 towards	multilateral	 and	 bilateral	 engagement	 have	 also	 been	 visible	 in	other	policy	areas.	There	has	been	much	engagement	with	regional	institutions	such	as	the	 Association	 of	 South	 East	 Asian	 Nations	 (ASEAN),	 the	 East	 Asia	 Summit,	 and	 the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	forum	(APEC)	(Blinken	2016;	Webster	2016).	These	institutions	span	a	wide	range	of	regional	policy	areas,	fostering	economic,	political	and	security	cooperation.		Furthermore,	the	United	States	has	invested	heavily	in	the	Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 (TPP)	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 economic	 integration	 with	 the	 Asia-Pacific	region.	The	focus	on	multilateral	and	bilateral	alliance	building	is	also	visible	in	the	U.S.’	rapprochement	to	countries	with	which	its	relations	have	been	historically	less	friendly.	Obama’s	recent	visit	to	Vietnam	and	the	simultaneous	lifting	of	the	arms	ban,	as	 well	 as	 support	 for	 the	 new	 government	 and	 careful	 democratization	 efforts	 of	Myanmar	show	an	increased	interest	in	a	network	of	fruitful	relations	in	Asia	(Blinken	2016;	Webster	2016).			
Smart	power	in	South	China	Sea	Policy	The	 current	 policy	 regarding	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 is	 built	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	international	 law,	 strengthening	 bilateral	 and	 international	 relations,	 and	 the	 use	 of	military	resources	to	send	a	message	to	China	and	reassure	American	allies.	In	order	to	assess	the	smart	power	provision	of	American	policy	towards	the	conflict	in	the	South																																																									6	See	U.S.	Department	of	State.	U.S.	Collective	Defense	Arrangements.	On:	http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/	
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China	Sea,	it	is	important	to	consider	both	the	strategies	and	the	respective	goals	of	the	policy	 used,	 as	 well	 as	 alternative	 policy	 options.	 So	 far,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 Obama	administration	has	tried	to	manage	the	South	China	Sea	conflict	by	pursuing	a	strategy	that	combines	diplomacy	and	military	power	(McDevitt	2015;	Glaser	2015;	Green	et.	al.	2016;	 Blinken	 2016;	 van	 Wijk	 2016,	 161).	 Combined,	 these	 two	 aspects	 create	 a	strategy	 based	 on	 broad	 multilateral	 cooperation,	 support	 for	 universal	 values	 and	international	law,	and	flashes	of	traditional	military	power.			 If	 we	 think	 about	 smart	 power	 strategies	 as	 the	 means	 of	 combining	 various	sources	of	power	 into	a	strategy	that	 is	best	suited	to	reach	a	country’s	objective,	 it	 is	important	 to	consider	 the	wider	context	 in	which	 the	policy	 is	crafted.	For	 the	United	States,	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 provides	 important	 trade	 routes	 as	 well	 as	 economic	opportunities.	 Given	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 interests	 involved,	 non-involvement	 in	 the	conflict	 is	not	an	option.	The	United	States	could	have	stepped	away,	 instead	urging	a	larger	Asian	power	such	as	Indonesia	to	take	the	lead	in	handling	the	conflict	(McDevitt	2013,	184).	However,	given	China’s	relative	regional	power	this	would	be	an	uncertain	deterrence	 policy,	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 ineffective.	 There	 are	 important	 global	geopolitical	aspects	to	the	conflict	that	need	to	be	considered	when	thinking	about	the	question	of	“smartness”	of	American	foreign	policy.	The	South	China	Sea	is	only	a	small	part	 of	 the	 Sino-American	 relationship,	 which	 also	 spans	 larger,	 transnational	 and	ideological	(policy)	areas.		 As	stated	before,	American	interest	in	the	South	China	Sea	conflict	is	not	so	much	about	 the	 islands	 themselves	but	more	 about	 the	 implications	of	China’s	behavior	 for	the	 international	 system.	 The	 United	 States	 derives	 its	 power	 not	 only	 from	 its	overwhelming	military	might,	but	also	from	its	position	in	the	rules-based	global	order	that	it	helped	to	build	after	World	War	II	(Ikenberry	2011,	61;	Mead	2014,	73).	It	has	an	interest	in	maintaining	this	order	and	promoting	the	universal	values	of	democracy	and	international	 law	 that	 underline	 the	 current	 system.	 Paramount	 in	 this	 system	 are	convictions	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 territorial	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 right	 to	nonintervention;	 convictions	 that	 China	 undermines	 through	 its	 assertive	 behavior	regarding	territory	in	the	South	China	Sea.			 The	 task,	 for	 the	 United	 States,	 then	 becomes	 not	 only	 safeguarding	 its	 own	tangible	 economic	 and	military	 interests	 but	 also	 protecting	 the	 values	 on	which	 the	world	order	 is	based.	 Simultaneously,	 in	order	 to	 successfully	pursue	 certain	 security	
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interests	such	as	nonproliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction,	mainly	within	Asia	itself,	 continued	 cooperation	 with	 China	 is	 important	 (Green	 et.	 al.	 2016,	 27).	 The	situation	 then	 becomes	 almost	 like	 balancing	 a	 scale:	 denouncing	 China’s	 behavior	 in	the	South	China	Sea,	 supporting	 international	 law,	and	making	sure	not	 to	antagonize	China	fully	so	cooperation	is	still	possible	–	all	at	once.			 Looking	at	the	result	of	the	policy	so	far,	the	United	States	has	refused	to	use	its	military	power	 to	 change	 the	 current	 status	quo	by	 force.	 Stronger	military	 emphasis	could	 lead	 to	 escalation	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 strong	 deterioration	 of	 the	 U.S.-Sino	relationship	 –	 a	 risk	 that	 could	 have	 even	 further	 implications	 for	 regional	 security,	especially	 cooperation	 with	 regard	 to	 North	 Korea	 operations	 (McDevitt	 2013,	 184;	Rapp-Hooper	 2016).	 Instead,	 American	 military	 resources	 are	 used	 to	 conduct	operations	 that	 inherently	 support	 international	 law,	 such	 as	 FONOPs.	 Investing	 in	bilateral	 and	multilateral	 relations	 allow	 the	 United	 States	 to	 forge	 closer	 ties	 to	 the	region	and	institutionalize	the	values	underlying	the	liberal	international	order.	This	in	turn	 further	advances	 the	country’s	economic	and	security	 interests,	while	 frustrating	China’s	objectives.	At	the	moment,	the	United	States	is	far	more	involved	in	the	conflict	than	China	would	like.	The	United	States	has	tried	to	pursue	 its	 interests	by	a	refusal	 to	officially	 take	sides	 on	 the	 various	 sovereignty	 claims	 in	 the	 South	China	 Sea.	 It	 has	 refrained	 from	deeper	 involvement,	 for	 instance	 in	 the	 form	of	mediation	or	negotiation	between	the	various	parties.	 Instead,	emphasizing	 international	 law	and	strengthening	multilateral	ties	 and	 cooperation	 allows	 the	 United	 States	 to	 counterbalance	 China’s	 relative	strength	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 area	while	 promoting	 its	 own	 interests	 and	 avoiding	deeper	entanglement	in	the	conflict.			 One	aspect	that	hinders	the	United	States	in	the	promotion	of	international	law	and	 the	 liberal	 international	 order	 is	 its	 non-ratification	 of	 UNCLOS.	While	 China	 has	ratified	 the	 treaty,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 not.	 Ratification	 of	 UNCLOS	 would	 give	 the	United	States	more	credibility	in	its	position	in	the	South	China	Sea	Conflict,	and	would	strengthen	its	arguments	regarding	international	law	as	the	basis	for	conflict	solution.				Overall,	 while	 China	 continues	 to	 aggravate	 its	 neighbors	 with	 its	 many	territorial	 claims,	 the	 result	 of	 the	 American	 policy	 so	 far	 seems	 to	 be	 deterrence	 of	increased	Chinese	aggression	and	countering	of	its	A2/AD	strategy.	The	current	policy	carefully	 balances	 the	 U.S.-Sino	 bilateral	 relationship	 with	 broader	 multilateral	
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cooperation	in	the	region.	While	it	irritates	China,	the	current	American	policy	has	not	led	to	a	disastrous	deterioration	of	relations	between	the	two	countries.	Considering	 the	 geopolitics	 involved	 in	 the	 South	China	 Sea	 conflict,	 the	policy	adopted	by	the	Obama	administration	can	be	considered	a	smart	one,	albeit	it	could	be	–	for	 lack	of	a	better	 term	-	smarter.	While	 increased	attention	to	 international	 law	and	the	institutionalization	of	universal	democratic	values	allow	the	United	States	to	defend	the	 current	 status	 quo	 of	 the	 international	 system,	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 United	 States	ratification	 of	 UNCLOS	 affects	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 American	 position	 in	 the	 conflict.	The	current	American	South	China	Sea	policy	seems	to	carefully	balance	dimensions	of	territorial	 integrity,	bilateral	relations,	democratic	values,	and	the	liberal	 international	order	based	on	a	 rules-based	system	of	 international	 law.	However,	 the	United	States	itself	 could	 do	 more	 in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 its	 position	 regarding	 the	 validity	 of	international	law	and	the	broader	liberal	international	order.		
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Conclusion	
	Reflecting	on	American	foreign	policy	strategy	in	conflict	situations,	it	is	clear	that	smart	power	forms	the	basis	on	which	policy	is	formulated	under	the	Obama	administration.	The	2015	National	Security	Strategy	and	Hillary	Clinton’s	elaboration	on	the	Asia	pivot	both	embrace	the	concept	of	smart	power	as	a	starting	point	for	foreign	policy.	In	both	the	Ukraine	crisis	and	the	conflict	 in	the	South	China	Sea,	 the	American	approach	to	a	solution	 has	 been	 based	 on	 broad	 multilateral	 cooperation	 combined	 with	 more	traditional	military	 resources.	But	while	 there	 is	 a	 visible	 combining	of	 hard	 and	 soft	power	 resources,	 the	 power	 context	 differs,	 and	 both	 strategies	 display	 areas	 of	improvement.		 Regarding	the	Ukraine	crisis,	American	policy	is	based	on	means	of	payment	and	threat	as	well	as	on	aid.	Economic	sanctions	combined	with	an	increase	in	NATO	forces,	financial	 aid	 to	Ukraine,	 and	 emphasis	 on	 international	 law	display	 the	use	 of	 a	wide	array	of	foreign	policy	resources.	But	while	the	sanctions	have	hit	the	Russian	economy	hard,	 continuing	 violations	 of	 the	Minsk-II	 agreement	 as	well	 as	 a	 refusal	 on	Russian	side	to	cede	back	Crimea	to	Ukraine	have	not	yet	led	to	great	change.	The	humanitarian	situation	in	especially	the	Donetsk	and	Luhansk	regions	is	dire,	and	the	current	status	quo	 in	 these	 regions	 has	 taken	 on	 characteristics	 of	 a	 frozen	 conflict	 (Nilsson	 2016).	While	 the	 situation	 is	manageable,	 long-term	European	 stability	 and	 security	 has	 not	been	reached.			 There	are	visible	similarities	between	American	policy	in	the	Ukraine	crisis	and	American	 policy	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 conflict.	 Combining	military	 resources	 in	 the	form	 of	 FONOPS	 and	 defense	 agreements	 with	 multilateral	 alliance	 building	 and	 a	similar	 emphasis	 on	 concepts	 of	 international	 law,	 the	 policy	 is	 diverse	 in	 its	 use	 of	policy	 tools.	But	while	China’s	claims	have	been	condemned	by	 the	United	States,	and	the	 Permanent	 Court	 of	 Arbitration	 of	 ITLOS	 has	 discharged	 the	 nine-dashed-line	argument,	American	policy	has	not	led	to	any	political	change	on	China’s	side.	There	has	not	been	any	halting	of	the	Chinese	militarization	of	islets	and	atolls	in	the	South	China	Sea.					 Despite	 the	 similarities	 between	 the	 two	 cases,	 there	 are	 visible	 differences	 in	context	relating	to	power	and	international	law.	While	both	conflicts	surround	issues	of	territorial	sovereignty,	the	areas	involved	differ.	Crimea	and	the	Donbas	region	belong	
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to	Ukraine	 and	 are	part	 of	 its	 sovereign	 territory.	The	Russian	 invasion	was	 clearly	 a	breach	 of	 international	 law	 and	 the	 principles	 it	 adheres	 to,	 the	 most	 important	 of	which,	in	this	case,	the	right	to	nonintervention.	Yet	China’s	behavior	in	the	South	China	Sea	 concerns	 unclaimed	 territory.	 Despite	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 set	 in	 UNCLOS,	there	is	no	clear	breach	of	sovereign	territory,	only	of	access	to	the	South	China	Sea	and	EEZs.		 The	difference	 in	sovereignty	 issues	has	 led	to	different	American	responses	to	the	 crises.	While	 Russia	 has	 faced	 sanctions	 that	 have	 damaged	 its	 economy,	 China’s	behavior	 has	 not	 elicited	 the	 same	 reaction	 on	 part	 of	 the	 United	 States.	 For	 while	Russia	 is	 a	 power	 in	 decline,	 China	 is	 a	 regional	 power	 rising.	 Necessity	 for	 Chinese	cooperation	on	transnational	issues	is	therefore	even	greater	than	Russia’s.	China	has	a	greater	 ability	 to	 influence	 world	 affairs,	 and	 the	 increased	 focus	 on	 Asia	 so	 clearly	articulated	in	the	Asia	Pivot	and	2015	NSS	shows	that	the	United	States	is	aware	of	this	development.	The	different	contexts	thus		draw	different	responses.		The	 two	 case	 studies	 at	 hand	 show	 that	 smart	 power	 is	 present	 in	 various	aspects	of	the	policies	implemented.	However,	smart	power	seems	to	serve	mostly	as	a	doctrine	 or	 concept,	 and	 sometimes	 lacks	 integration	 into	 practice.	 Looking	 at	 the	Ukraine	 crisis	 and	 the	 South	China	 Sea	 conflict,	 there	 seems	 to	be	 a	 gap	between	 the	theory	and	practice	of	smart	power.	In	both	cases,	there	has	been	balancing	between	the	immediate	 policy	 goals	 and	 the	 broader	 global	 context.	 Both	 hard	 and	 soft	 power	resources,	 ranging	 from	 economic	 sanctions	 and	 military	 vessels	 to	 multilateral	network	 building	 and	 bilateral	 rapprochement,	 have	 been	 used	 to	 build	 a	 strategy	custom	 for	 the	 situation.	 However,	 as	we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 case,	 the	ratification	 of	 UNCLOS	 by	 the	 United	 States	 would	 increase	 its	 soft	 power	 by	strengthening	 its	 arguments	 on	 international	 law.	Both	 strategies,	 therefore,	 could	 be	even	smarter.		
International	liberal	order	While	the	conversion	of	smart	power	theory	into	practice	leaves	room	for	improvement,	the	idea	of	smart	power	is	valuable	as	a	basis	for	policy	formation.	It	fits	the	changing	nature	 of	 power	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 and	 the	 increasingly	 transnational	 global	challenges	 the	United	States	 faces.	The	diversification	of	 foreign	policy	 resources	 that	
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the	 concept	 of	 smart	 power	 encourages	 fits	 the	 changing	 power	 dynamics	 in	 the	geopolitical	environment.		The	 flexibility	 in	 policy	 formation	 that	 smart	 power	 encourages	 allows	 for	effective	 handling	 of	 conflicts	 on	 different	 levels.	When	 dealing	 with	 powers	 such	 as	Russia	and	China,	as	the	Ukraine	crisis	and	South	China	Sea	conflict	show,	the	situation	often	 necessitates	 a	 diplomatic	 factor	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 antagonizing	 these	 countries.	This	allows	the	United	States	 to	continue	cooperation	with	Russia	and	China	on	other	important	 issues	 such	 as	 North	 Korean	 nuclear	 proliferation	 and	 transnational	challenges	 such	 as	 terrorism.	 Keeping	 certain	 doors	 open	 requires	 careful	 balancing	between	 various	 interests,	 a	 task	 that	 is	 being	 served	 by	 using	 smart	 power	 as	 a	concept.	By	not	solely	relying	on	one	type	of	power	projection	but	combining	different	policy	 tools	 into	 a	 coherent	 strategy,	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 simultaneously	 manage	various	interests	on	different	levels.				 Formulating	 smart	 power	 policy	 thus	 requires	 consideration	 of	 the	 broader,	global	geopolitical	situation.	For	the	United	States,	handling	international	conflicts	such	as	the	Ukraine	Crisis	and	the	South	China	Sea	conflict	is	not	solely	about	tangible	gains.	While	 security	 and	 access	 to	 key	 economic	 markets	 are	 important,	 there	 is	 a	 larger	ideological	interest	at	stake	too.	Securing	the	continuing	existence	of	the	American	led	international	liberal	order	is	a	major	interest,	for	it	allows	the	United	States	to	maintain	its	 position	 as	 a	 global	 power.	 This	 liberal	 international	 order,	 based	on	principles	 of	territorial	 integrity,	 sovereignty,	 and	 nonintervention,	 only	 functions	 when	 countries	adhere	to	the	rules.	Chinese	and	Russian	behavior	thus	not	only	poses	problems	in	the	sphere	of	more	practical	geopolitical	security,	but	also	towards	the	 ideological	core	of	the	 liberal	 world	 order.	 Condemnations	 of	 violations	 of	 international	 law	 are	 visibly	present	at	the	forefront	of	the	American	reaction	regarding	the	Ukraine	crisis	and	South	China	Sea	conflict.			 However,	one	pitfall	 that	 the	United	States	needs	 to	avoid	 in	order	 to	make	 its	foreign	policy	smarter	is	overreliance	on	the	American	liberal	worldview	(Mearsheimer	2014,	84).	While	the	nature	of	power	is	changing,	geopolitics	is	still	very	much	present,	and	other	powers	still	adhere	to	its	principles	in	a	traditional	Realist	fashion.	Russia	has	felt	threatened	by	European	Union	expansion	into	former	Soviet	territory,	and	China’s	A2/AD	 strategy	 shows	 that	 it	 too	 considers	 realist	 principles	 of	 security	 to	 still	 be	relevant.	Failure	by	the	United	States	to	acknowledge	that	some	countries	reject	or	feel	
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threatened	by	the	liberal	international	order	can	lead	to	exacerbation	of	conflicts	and	is	counterproductive	to	the	pursuit	of	its	global	interests.		The	concept	of	smart	power	allows	the	United	States	to	solidify	its	position	in	the	global	order.	In	a	time	where	security	threats	are	becoming	increasingly	transnational	and	the	nature	of	power	is	changing,	smart	power	provides	a	 framework	according	to	which	 these	 challenges	 can	 be	managed.	A	 larger	 focus	 on	 soft	 power	 and	diplomacy	facilitate	 more	 diplomatic	 approaches.	 The	 multilateral	 alliance	 building	 in	 Asia	 in	response	 to	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 conflict	 and	 continuing	 cooperation	 with	 European	countries	regarding	the	Ukraine	crisis	not	only	serve	immediate	American	interests	but	also	contribute	to	strengthening	the	system	according	to	which	global	politics	functions.																				
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